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1. Introduction 
 
This paper critically assesses North’s (1981; 1990) attempt at relating 
transaction cost and economic performance, and argues for considering ‘transition cost’, 
separately from transaction cost, in designing institutional change. The ‘reformers’ are 
often interested in possible transaction cost reducing effect of institutional transition. 
But an institutional transition can be justified only if the reduction in transaction cost 
more than compensates for transition cost involved. Many institutional reforms fail 
because they ignore or underestimate the aspect of transition cost, the size of which is 
specific to institutions concerned.  
The paper expands on Khan’s (1995) concept of political transition cost and 
highlights the need to analyse economic ‘transition cost’ with the case of the economic 
reform after the financial crisis in 1997. It argues that, as differences in ‘political 
settlements’ across countries call for different strategies for transition, different risk-
taking mechanism at the national level also necessitates to take different approaches to 
reforming an economy.  
 
2. Transaction Cost Economics and Economic Performance 
 
Transaction cost economics, often categorised under ‘new institutional 
economics’, has drawn broad interest among economists and economic historians 
because of some new aspects in its approach. A long tradition of institutional 
economists had failed to produce common conceptual framework to analyse 
institutions: the consensus among them stopped at agreeing on the importance of   2
institutions in economic activities and the need for incorporating institutions in 
economic analysis. But the novelty of transaction cost economics lies in its attempt to 
explain institutions with a common concept, i.e., transaction cost, and analyse them with 
the tools employed in conventional economics.
1 Its principal message is that the 
existence and changes of institutions can be explained in terms of transaction cost 
economising behaviour of individuals. For instance, Williamson (1985: 1) argues that 
economic institutions “have the main purpose and effect of economizing on transaction 
cost”. North also maintains that a country’s successful economic performance can be 
attributed to its institutional structure that keeps its transaction costs low. 
In understanding transaction cost economics, it is important to note that it started 
basically from an attempt to rectify deficiencies of the concept of production cost in the 
standard neo-classical economics. According to Williamson, “[p]retransaction-cost 
economics [i.e., neo-classical economics] takes the organization of economic activity as 
given and characterizes firms as production functions with a motive of profit 
maximization” (1985: 199) whereas “transaction cost economics maintains ... that 
organizational variety arises primarily in the service of transaction cost economizing” 
(1985: 387). North also separates transaction cost from transformation cost which is 
almost identical to Williamson’s production cost. For both of them, the total cost related 
to economic activities is the sum of production (or transformation) cost and transaction 
cost.  
However, by taking the neoclassical production function as its reference point, 
transaction cost is defined as costs related with ‘frictions’ (Williamson 1985: 18-19), or 
                                                 
1 For discussion of different strands of institutionalists, refer to Langlois (1986: 1-25); 
Hodgson (1991); Matthews (1986); Boulding (1957); Dorfman et al (1963).   3
those involved in ‘economic exchange’ (North 1990: 27), which do not appear in the 
standard production function. The contents of transaction cost are therefore specified as 
a residual of those of production cost.
2 For Williamson (1985: 20-22), they are the costs 
related to a contract both ex ante and ex post. For North (1990: 28), they are all the costs 
incurred in “defining, protecting and enforcing the property rights to goods (the right to 
use, the right to derive income from the use of, the right to exclude, and the right to 
exchange)”, as compared to the costs incurred in “transforming the physical attributes of 
goods (size, weight, color, location, chemical composition, and so forth). And North 
emphasises the importance of transaction cost in the national economy with a 
calculation that more than 45 percent of the U.S. national income is currently devoted to 
transacting activities. 
Apart from considering this ‘hidden cost’, transaction cost economics is based 
on rational choice of individuals as same as neo-classical economics: what drives its 
system is cost minimising (or utility maximising) behaviour of individuals. In this 
regard, North (1990: 83) asserts that “[t]he agent of change is the individual 
entrepreneur responding to the incentives embodied in the institutional framework”. 
Institutional change is therefore understood as a consequence of voluntary contracts and 
a major impetus here is changes in relative prices.
3 Like in the neoclassical world, it is 
                                                 
2 In this context, Khan (1995: 74) points out “the gap between the neoclassical 
production function and reality can always and tautologically be attributed to 
transaction cost”. 
3 North (1990: 86) argues as follows: “A change in relative prices leads one or both 
parties to an exchange, whether it is political or economic, to perceive that either or both 
could do better with an altered agreement or contract. An attempt will be made to 
renegotiate the contract... Over time, the rule may be changed or simply be ignored and   4
also assumed that institutional change driven by rational choice of individuals would 
lead to an ideal institution, if free negotiation over contracts is ensured. 
In the real world, however, there are many obstacles that hinder institutional 
change towards efficiency improvements. North refers to the force behind those 
obstacles as ‘path-dependence’ and argues that institutional change occurs 
‘incrementally’ or ‘at the margin’ due to the path-dependence. For North, the most 
important factor in determining the path-dependence is the political ‘market’ because 
“[t]he polity specifies and enforces the property rights of the economic marketplace ...” 
(1990: 109). Then, he boldly concludes: “The condition [for political market to 
approximate to the zero transaction cost model for efficient economic change] is easily 
stated” and this “is a modern democratic society with universal suffrage” (1990: 109, 
emphasis added). He supports his argument with a comparison between the British-
North American path and the Spanish-South American path of economic development. 
He also applies this conclusion to a comparison of economic performance between the 
First World countries and the Third World countries. 
 
  How successful is the project of transaction cost economics? Let me answer 
the question by probing its methodological underpinnings. 
First, although transaction cost economics originated from dissatisfaction of 
neo-classical economics, it accepts the inherent efficiency of the neo-classical world. 
This is mainly in order to compare economic performance of different institutions with 
an absolute scale. By measuring the size of frictions from this reference point, 
                                                                                                                                               
unenforced. Similarly, a custom or tradition may be gradually eroded and replaced with 
another”.   5
transaction cost aims at an ordering of economic institutions. This attempt may be all 
right for those who believe in the long-term efficiency of the neo-classical world.  
However, even in the neo-classical framework, a world with one distortion is not 
necessarily more efficient than the one with two or more distortions, as the second-best 
theorem in welfare economics shows.
4 The size of ‘friction’ does not give a definite 
efficiency implication here. Also the issue of dynamic efficiency has yet resolved in the 
neo-classical framework because there is no guarantee that the pursuit of allocative 
efficiency will bring about ‘growth effects’, although it has ‘level effects’ (Lucas 1988: 
12).
5 A short-term friction-minimising institution is thus not necessarily the best 
performing one in the long term. Moreover, for those who do not accept the efficiency 
of the neo-classical world, the size of frictions from the neo-classical world does not 
give any efficiency implication. North’s analysis of institution and economic 
performance is advanced without providing plausible criteria for dynamic efficiency, 
but with merely assuming the dynamic efficiency of the neo-classical world. 
  Secondly, transaction cost economics resorts to a residual analysis: the 
focus of the analysis is the residual of production function on the supposition that 
determinants of production function are separate from those of the residual. North 
(1990: 27) argues that changes in transformation cost are basically affected by 
technological change whereas changes in transaction cost are influenced by 
institutional change. In this way, efficiency of institutions can be analysed by 
                                                 
4 For discussion of the second-best theorem, see Bohm (1987); Boadway & Bruce 
(1984: 131-36).   6
exclusively focusing on transaction cost and explained in terms of ‘approximation’ 
from the idealised institution. In the same context, he contends that, if we ‘add’ a 
theory of production to his theory of transaction cost, “we can then analyze the role 
of institutions in the performance of economies”. 
However, North neglects the possibility that transaction cost can be inter-related 
with production cost in his supposition that institutions only affect transaction cost. But 
institutions also critically affect production function, i.e., technology, as neo-
Schumpeterian studies of national innovation system demonstrate (refer to Freeman 
1987; Lundvall 1992; Nelson 1993). If we take this view, the crucial issue becomes 
developing a theory that deals with both production and transaction cost at the same 
time, rather than adding one theory to the other. 
Thirdly, transaction cost economics adopts a reductionism in its actual analysis: 
Complex factors determining the efficiency of institutions are progressively reduced to 
certain ultimate factors. As I pointed out above, they are reduced to transaction cost, 
separated from production cost in the first place. The determinants of transaction cost, 
especially those of path dependence, are then reduced to ‘political market’. North again 
reduces determinants of the efficiency of political market to the possibility of free 
negotiation over contracts. 
However, there is also path dependence resulting from economic variables and 
this has important implications in comparing economic performance across countries as 
well as designing institutional change, as I will show later (section 4). This aspect is 
                                                                                                                                               
5 Level effects refer to once-and-for-all changes that raise or lower balanced growth 
paths without affecting their slope, whereas growth effects refer to changes in 
parameters that alter growth rates along balanced paths.   7
neglected in North’s analysis because he excludes production function from his 
institutional analysis. It is also the case that, even in the most democratic polity, 
compensations to losers are not sufficiently made, or efficiency-enhancing institutional 
changes are blocked by interest group politics. 
Considering the deficiencies discussed above, the only support given to North’s 
conclusion is his comparison between the British-North American path and the Spanish-
South American path of economic development. However, since his case study is not 
exhaustive, it not difficult to find cases to contradict his conclusion merely by looking 
outside his comparative setting. For instance, the economic recovery of France after the 
end of World War II was carried out with a sweeping nationalisation, i.e., by limiting 
individuals’ freedom to negotiate over contracts.
6 Chang (1994) argues, by employing 
the very concept of transaction cost, that state intervention in South Korea contributed 
to reducing, rather than increasing, transaction costs. Elbaum & Lazonick (1986: 11) 
also attribute one reason for the long-term decline of British industry from the late 
nineteenth century to the British state’s “reluctance to break from laissez-faire 
traditions”. 
Unfortunately for North, the introduction of a new concept like transaction cost 
does not bring about any definite efficiency implication of institutions. As Matthews 
(1986: 907) points out, transaction cost economics therefore “has been invoked in 
support of both market pessimism and market optimism”. This is fundamentally 
because there is no such thing as the most efficient institution in the real world, by 
deviations from which we can gauge relative efficiency of other institutions. Any 
                                                 
6 See Kuisel (1981)   8
institution has its own merits and demerits in itself. And its net efficiency is 
indeterminate without considering the context in which it operates. 
As we shall elaborate further below, the main difficulty as well as significance 
of institutional analysis lies in the lack of absolute reference point and the importance of 
context in comparison. By ignoring this fundamental aspect, North attempts to provide a 
universal theory of institution and institutional change, and inevitably relies on 
reductionism and residual analysis.   
 
 
3. Transition cost and system transition 
 
  Although we are not able to define the most efficient institution in absolute 
terms, it is not impossible to compare relative efficiency of institutions at a given time 
and among limited number of countries. For instance, when the Japanese economy 
outperformed the U.S. economy in the 1970s and 1980s, we can trace reasons for the 
different economic performance between the two countries to their differences in 
institutions. Likewise, in understanding the resurgence of the U.S. economy and the 
stagnation of the Japanese economy during the 1990s, we may find some institutional 
reasons for the different performance between the two countries. Similarly, it also 
makes good sense to compare institutions of East Asian NICs with those of Latin 
American countries if we want to investigate the reasons behind their differential   9
economic performance during last couple of decades. Most studies on institutions and 
economic performance are actually undertaken in this manner.
7 
  What should be noted is that this kind of institutional comparison is basically 
static one. During a given period, it is assumed, implicitly or explicitly, that major 
institutional features of countries in question remain same and those features are 
attributed to explaining performance. If those features are fluid, it is difficult to 
characterise institutions and to attribute them to performance. This static analysis is the 
beginning of any institutional analysis and there are certainly great utilities in it. 
Through relating institutional features to performance, we can draw meaningful 
implications on what are important aspects of well-functioning institutions, how a 
system can reduce its maintenance cost, what can be potentially improved on less-well-
functioning institutions and so on. 
  However, in designing institutional change, this consideration of static aspects is 
not sufficient, though it may be necessary. Let us suppose that a system (S1) performed 
better than another system (S2) in certain period. We may ‘explain’ that S1 had lower 
maintenance cost than S2, or conclude that S1 was ‘superior’ to S2. But the superiority 
of S1 itself does not necessitate for S2 to make a transition to S1. This is mainly 
because an additional cost consideration is required in ‘changing’ a system. If the cost 
involved in shifting S2 to S1 more than offsets the expected benefit of lowering 
maintenance cost of S2, it is not desirable to make such a transition. 
  Khan (1995) names this cost involved in institutional transition as ‘transition 
cost’ and argues that it should be given a separate treatment from transaction cost. North 
                                                 
7 For a detailed methodological discussion on comparative institutional analysis, refer to 
my companion paper (Shin 2002).   10
does not seriously consider transition cost because, in emphasising the importance of 
‘path dependence’, he conceives institutional change predominantly as changes ‘at the 
margin’. Path-changing institutional changes, i.e., changes in characteristic features of 
institutions, are precluded in this perception. As regards forces influencing path 
dependence, North (1990: 95) vaguely refers to ‘increasing returns’ and ‘market 
imperfections’, citing Arthur (1989), but he does not elaborate on them except saying 
that changes in paths “will typically occur through changes in the polity” (1990: 112). 
Overall, transition through changes in the polity is not considered seriously in North’s 
analysis. 
  Khan rejects this North-type view of institutional change through voluntary 
negotiations as following:  
“But in fact important real world institutional changes are rarely 
accompanied by the compensation of losers. Human history may not be a 
history of class struggle alone but it is certainly not a history of negotiated 
institutional change. Modelling institutional change ‘as if’ it were a 
negotiated process with compensation allows the importation of 
sophisticated tools ... but makes the analysis seriously deficient. Real-world 
institutional change involves path changes. These are discontinuous breaks 
in the paths ... Even relatively minor institutional changes such as changes 
in tax rates are typically not negotiated through compensating side-
payments” (1995: 82). 
And he defines transition cost as “the political cost faced by initiators of new 
institutions” (1995: 81), or “the political cost which potential losers from a proposed   11
institutional change can impose on the proponents” (1995: 82), and argues for placing 
the concept of transition cost at the centre of the analysis of institutional change.  
For Khan, the most important determinant of transition cost is ‘political 
settlement’, which is “the balance of power between the classes and groups affected 
by ... [given] institution” (1995: 77), because the cost depends critically on the ‘intensity 
and extent of resistance’ by losers. But it is difficult to measure the cost quantitatively 
because they are often “inflicted on a specified group by political events such as 
physical violence or defeats in elections” (1995: 82). The size of transition cost is also 
institution-specific because political settlement is diverse across countries and therefore 
costs arising from resistance to proposed institutional change are different according to 
differences in the existing political settlements in question. 
  In this situation, the best an initiator of a transition can do is “the [subjective] 
ranking of composite bundle of costs” associated with alternatives in hand, and chooses 
a strategy for transition accordingly (1995: 83). In this process, some strategies 
considered to incur too high transition costs are eliminated from feasible options. Khan 
(1989; 1995) illustrates this point with the case of the unsuccessful attempt by the 
Pakistan government in the 1960s to establish a developmental state. The Ayub Khan 
regime was a ‘strong state’ equipped with the oppressive power comparable to its 
counterparts in East Asian countries like South Korea or Taiwan and instituted a similar 
developmental strategy. However, “[t]he experiment was abandoned after the uprising 
of 1969-71 and a civil war in which possibly a million people died” (1995: 85). For 
Khan, this failure was mainly due to attempting an institutional transition without fully 
considering costs from ‘resistance’ to the proposed change. And he argues that other   12
strategies of transition must have been preferable for Pakistan to attempting to establish 
an East Asian type developmental state. 
 
4. Economic transition cost: The case of Korea 
 
  While Khan proposes the concept of transition cost mainly in relation with 
political costs involved in institutional change, I would add an economic dimension of 
transition cost. That is, even if there are no serious political costs, there may be 
significant economic costs in institutional transition. This is mainly because economic 
institutions of a country are also produces of its own historical development, and 
therefore closely intertwined with other related components of the economy such as 
composition of industries, developmental stage and other historical heritages of the 
country, which cannot be changed overnight. When a radical institutional change is 
attempted, it is therefore possible that it conflicts with the related components of the 
economy and results in economic costs. I will illustrate this point below with an analysis 
of institutional transition in South Korea after the 1997 financial crisis under the 
stewardship of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
On the allegation that the close ‘state-banks-chaebols’ nexus, which had been a 
central institutional feature of the economy, was the root cause of the crisis, the Korean 
government and the IMF attempted to shift it to an idealised Anglo-American system, 
following the ‘Washington consensus’. But the result so far is disappointing on a closer 
look though the macroeconomic recovery of the country may look impressive. This was 
mainly because the ‘reformers’ neglected or at best under-estimated economic costs 
involved in the systemic transition and simply demolished the previous risk-taking   13
mechanism without building a new one in their lopsided concern for possible benefits of 
the reforms. 
  The previous risk-taking system in the Korean economy can be described as a 
state-mediated bank financing system, in which the state drafts industrial policy and the 
policy is implemented largely through the banking system, the main beneficiaries of 
which are the chaebols, family-owned business groups. The mechanism of close 
consultation between the state, banks, and the chaebols, reduced financial risks involved 
in high-risk projects at the national level. The internal transaction within the business 
group also helped further creation of credit. 
  A main strength of this system lies in its capacity to enable a high-pitched 
economic growth through maintaining high rate of investment, as Korea’s industrial 
history evidently shows. On the other hand, its potential weaknesses lie in the 
possibility that the economy may go wrong if the state does not effectively play its role 
as the ultimate system manager. In particular, given the fact that the economy is 
characterised by a relatively high reliance on foreign and corporate debts, a failure in 
the system management can easily turn into a financial crisis, as the Korean experience 
in 1997 testifies. 
  The post-1997 economic reform was principally geared at ‘fundamentally’ 
correcting the potential weaknesses of the system and consisted of the following 
elements: (1) The role of the government was confined to supervising financial 
institutions and maintaining competitive market order, in the process of which financial 
supervision standards and fair trading regulations were strengthened substantially; (2) 
The financial sector was assigned to take over the role of the nerve centre of economic 
management; (3) Companies were required to compete as independent units, rather than   14
as members of business groups, and corporate governance was strengthened; and (4) 
External liberalisation, both in the product and service market, progressed in full. Along 
with these reform measures, a radical reduction of corporate debt-equity ratio was 
enforced and new engines of growth were sought from foreign capital and venture 
businesses. Thus seen, the IMF programme applied to Korea was the deepest and 
broadest one ever experimented in any crisis-hit countries, often called as the ‘IMF 
plus’ by local press. 
  What are the benefits of this institutional transition? It seems to us that the actual 
benefits are minimal so far. The only positive result of the reform programme was the 
establishment of a strong ‘check and balance’ system between financial institutions, 
companies and shareholders, which may help reduce some of the worst abuses of the 
system. Financial institutions are no longer allowed to keep accumulating non-
performing loans (NPLs) as they are now forced to close or merge if they do not 
maintain minimum BIS ratios. It has also become difficult for the chaebol ‘owners’ to 
make ‘excessive diversification’ due to the increased transparency in accounting and the 
strengthening of the right of minority shareholders. 
  However, the reduction in financial risk of the system, the very aim of instituting 
this new ‘check and balance’ system, was not quite realised. For instance, even with a 
radical reduction of corporate debt-equity ratio,
8 the problem of ‘thin profit margin’ in 
the corporate sector transformed only into that of ‘thinner profit margin’. The ratio of 
ordinary income to sales (ordinary profit rate) for the manufacturing sector recovered to 
1.68% in 1999, from negative figures in 1997 and 1998, but it slipped again to 1.29% in 
                                                 
8 The average debt-equity ratio of the manufacturing sector fell from 396% at the end of 
1997 to 214% at the end of 1999 and further to 210% in 2000.   15
2000.  The average ordinary profit rate for the two years of vigorous economic recovery 
after the crisis, during which the Korean economy expanded at the annual rate of 9.8%, 
was only around half of the historical average before the financial crisis (2.8% during 
1973-1996). If we include the figure for 2001, the year of sharp economic slowdown, 
the average is even worse at 1.12% (BOK website). As far as the balance sheet of the 
corporate sector is concerned, its financial vulnerability has actually become worse even 
after the structural reform. 
  Some benefits claimed by the IMF and the Korean government as the results of 
the reform are also misplaced. For instance, the short-term economic recovery in 1999 
and 2000 is more a consequence of adopting aggressive Keynesian policy than that of 
implementing economic reform. Similarly, the return of FDI from late 1998 was less 
due to the ‘restoration of investors’ confidence’ encouraged by Korea’s commitment to 
reform than due to the increasing prospect of the economic recovery. Inward FDI was 
also already on a trend increase from 1995, i.e., before the crisis, thanks to the 
relaxation in FDI regulations and strong growth of the domestic economy, contradicting 
the claim that Korea needed a fundamental reform to increase FDI. Moreover, most of 
FDI after the crisis was related with asset sales at hugely discounted prices that may 
eclipse the possible long-term benefit from introduction of ‘advanced’ management 
skills and technologies (For details, refer to Shin & Chang (2002, section 3.3)).  
On the other hand, the costs involved in this transition were very high. Table 1 
shows a rough figure of the transition cost as reflected in new NPLs created in the 
economy. The Korean government and the IMF often emphasise the reduction of NPLs 
as a major achievement of the reform programme. But this applies only to those within 
the financial sector, which shot up to 136.3 trillion won (US$113.5 billion), or 21.8% of   16
total loans, in June 1998, was reduced to 66.7 trillion won (11.3%) at the end of 1999, 
and 59.5 trillion won (9.6%) in March 2001. This reduction was mainly due to 
unprecedented injections of public funds and pressure from the government over 
financial institutions to improve their short-term balance sheets by disposing their assets.   
However, an often-neglected fact is that the amount of NPLs in the national 
economy has kept increasing.  The accumulated total of NPLs, which includes those 
driven out of the financial system through purchase by public funds or through 
disposition by financial institutions in the form of sales to private investors, liquidation 
and so on, increased from 97.4 trillion won at the end of 1997 to 232.8 trillion won at 
the end 2000.  During the three years after the financial crisis, 135.4 trillion won 
(US$112.8 billion) of new NPLs was created in the economy.  And the increase in NPLs 
continued in 2001.
9 
It is impossible to determine objectively how much of this increase in NPLs in 
the economy was due to ex post realisation of the latent troubles within the corporate 
sector accumulated before the crisis or due to the difficulties created by the new 
economic system. However, if we look at the financial flows from the financial sector to 
the corporate sector, the importance of the latter becomes clear. 
As table 2 shows, a remarkable trend in corporate financing after the crisis and 
subsequent reform was an abrupt depletion of external funds available for the corporate 
sector.  Even during the period of rapid economic recovery in 1999 and 2000, the 
                                                 
9 For instance, according to BOK (2001b), companies with lower than 100% of interest 
coverage ratio, that is, whose operating profit falls short of their interest payments 
obligations, have increased to 36.3% of listed manufacturing companies during the 
period of January to September 2001 from 27.6% during the same period in 2000.   17
external funds for the corporate sector was only around half of that available in 1997, 
and the situation became worse in 2001.  
  The main culprit here was the fall in ‘indirect financing’, i.e., the borrowing 
from financial institutions. In 1998 when the country was in the depth of the crisis, 
financial institutions withdrew 15.8 trillion won of loans from the corporate sector. 
Although indirect financing slowly began to recover, its level fell far short of the pre-
crisis level. The amount of external financing available in 1999, at 2.2 trillion won, was 
only about 5% of the 1997 level (43.4 trillion won). In 2000, it was still only 26% (11.4 
trillion won) of the 1997 level. As the economy began slowing down sharply in 2001 
along with the recession in the world economy, indirect financing shrank dramatically 
again to 2.5% (1.2 trillion won) of what was available in 1997. 
  Why has the credit crunch continued even after the Korean economy got over 
the initial shock of the financial crisis? It was mainly because the institutional transition 
created a vacuum in the risk-taking function of the economy, rather than re-establishing 
it. In the new institutional framework, the role of the state and the chaebol in the risk-
taking mechanism was diminished substantially and the financial sector became the 
major agent to assess and take risks in loan provisions. But its capability to do so was 
severely constrained in the context of the Korean economy.  
First, since commercial banks were in the process of ongoing re-organisation 
and many of them were placed under the ownership of the government, their primary 
concern was to meet newly-introduced supervision standards like BIS ratios and 
forward-looking criteria (FLC), which are in general penalising corporate lending. They 
had little incentive to take high risks in corporate lending.     18
Secondly, related with the above, managers in financial institutions had little 
incentive to resolve problems of bad loans by reviving the troubled companies. If they 
let those companies fail now, the failure will be considered as a result of poor lending 
decisions by their predecessors, whereas they will be held responsible if the firms they 
extended loans fail. They therefore tend to underestimate the value of currently ailing 
firms and prefer selling them, often at a highly discounted price, or liquidating them to 
putting in efforts to turn them around. And this incentive becomes stronger if the assets 
related with ailing firms are already classified as NPLs and therefore provisions against 
them have been made.
10 
Even if commercial banks are privatised, which is in my view unlikely to 
happen in the short run, it is difficult to expect that the financial sector’s risk-taking 
capability will soon be enhanced sufficiently to provide the corporate sector with 
necessary funds, because of the extremely conservative financial supervision standards 
that have been introduced following the crisis and the continuing lacklustre performance 
of the corporate sector. 
  One reason why Korea has been able to pay the huge transition costs so far 
without serious social conflicts is that its public finance was one of the soundest in the 
world.
11 In a sense, Korea bought out large part of potential conflicts in institutional 
transition with public money at least until now, unlike Khan’s original perception of 
transition cost. However, analytical implications of economic transition cost are similar 
                                                 
10 This was well reflected in creditor banks’ preference of selling Daewoo Motors and 
Hynix to foreign buyers than turning around them with their own initiatives.   19
to those of political transition cost. The economy works in quite diverse ways across 
countries and the size of economic transition cost resulting from the imposition of a new 
institution is also very different. When one attempts an institutional transition, this 
diversity should be considered. There is no absolute institution towards which any 




  Like the concept of transaction cost, acknowledging and considering the aspect 
of transition cost is disconcerting to researchers: It makes our analysis more 
complicated rather than simplified, and it becomes harder to draw ‘general’ implications. 
But this is the fact of life we have to counter rather than to avoid. North’s analysis of 
institutions avoids this complexity by resorting to residual analysis and reductionism, 
therefore provides little help in advancing our understanding of the process of 
institutional change. 
  A main reason why we need an institutional analysis is that diversity is often 
very important. There are certainly common aspects across institutions, which are 
important in explaining institutions and designing institutional transition. However, 
institutional analysis is more than finding common factors and drawing general 
implications out of them. We need institutional analysis because looking for 
commonality is not enough in understanding the reality and drawing meaningful 
                                                                                                                                               
11 Despite the substantial increase of budget deficits in the process of buying NPLs and 
recapitalising financial institutions, Korea’s ratio of public debt to GDP was only 23.4% 
at the end of 1999, still one of the lowest among the OECD countries.   20
implications for action. While acknowledging the recurrence of common factors over 
time or across countries, we need at the same time to see diversity resulting from 
peculiar characteristics of time and space. 
The only universal lesson that we can draw from institutional analysis would be 
that there is no panacea for institutional management and institutional change. ‘One-
size-fits-all’ solution often results in huge transition costs, as we saw above. The reality 
is full of grey areas which suggests us that there are many ‘middle roads’ for 
institutional transition. What is important is to find what middle roads are suitable to 
countries in question. 
 
   21
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Table 1. Changes in Non-Performing Loans after the Financial Crisis 
(trillion won, %) 
     
 
















Banks  31.6  40.0  33.7  37.1  39.7  56.5  42.1  38.1 












  82.5  64.6  59.5 








(15.0)  11.3  13.6  10.4  9.6 
Accumulate purchase 
of NPLs by public 
funds  
(B) 
11.0  13.8  44.0  46.1  56.0  81.5  95.2  90.6 
Accumulate disposal of 
NPLs by financial 
institutions  
(C) 
0  0  6.0  -  52.0  -  73.0  - 
Accumulate NPLs 
when purchase or 
disposition were not 
made  
(A+B+C) 
97.4  150.1  152.7  -  174.7  -  232.8  - 
 
Source: Adapted and calculated from PFOC (2000; 2001) and FSC website. 
Note: Figures in parentheses represent amount of NPLs or ratios of NPLs to total loans when 
forward looking criteria (FLC) is applied. The FTC began using FLC from the end of 1999 in 
reporting NPLs. 
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Table 2. External Financing of the Corporate Sector 
(billion won) 
      
  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
 Total  118,769  118,022  27,664  51,755  66,531  51,939 
 Indirect Financing 
   From Banks 



















 Direct Financing 
   CPs 
   Stocks 







































Source: Flow of Funds, BOK website    
Note : CP is corporate paper. CB is corporate bond. Others include corporate loans, 
government loans and so on 
 
 